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INCENTIVES TO LEARN
Michael Kremer, Edward Miguel, and Rebecca Thornton*
Abstract—We study a randomized evaluation of a merit scholarship
program in which Kenyan girls who scored well on academic exams had
school fees paid and received a grant. Girls showed substantial exam score
gains, and teacher attendance improved in program schools. There were
positive externalities for girls with low pretest scores, who were unlikely
to win a scholarship. We see no evidence for weakened intrinsic motiva-
tion. There were heterogeneous program effects. In one of the two
districts, there were large exam gains and positive spillovers to boys. In
the other, attrition complicates estimation, but we cannot reject the
hypothesis of no program effect.
I. Introduction
I
N many education systems, those who perform well on
exams covering the material of one level of education
receive free or subsidized access to the next level of edu-
cation. Independent of their role in allocating access to
higher levels of education, such merit scholarships are
attractive to the extent that they can potentially induce
greater student effort and that effort is an important input in
educational production, possibly with positive externalities
for other students.
This paper estimates the impact of a merit scholarship
program for girls in Kenyan primary schools. The scholar-
ship schools were randomly selected from among a group of
candidate schools, allowing differences in educational out-
comes between the program and comparison schools to be
attributed to the scholarship. We ﬁnd evidence for positive
program impacts on academic performance: girls who were
eligible for scholarships in program schools had signiﬁ-
cantly higher test scores than comparison schoolgirls.
Teacher attendance also improved signiﬁcantly in program
schools, establishing a plausible behavioral mechanism for
the test score gains.
The merit scholarship program we study was conducted
in two neighboring Kenyan districts. Separate randomiza-
tions into program and comparison groups were conducted
in each district, allowing separate analysis by district. In the
larger and somewhat more prosperous district (Busia), test
scores gains were large among both girls and boys, and
teacher attendance also increased. In the smaller district
(Teso), the analysis is complicated by attrition of scholar-
ship program schools and students, so bounds on estimated
treatment effects are wide, but we cannot reject the hypoth-
esis that there was no program effect there.
We ﬁnd positive program externalities among girls with
low pretest scores, who were unlikely to win; in fact, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that test score gains were the
same for girls with low versus high pretest scores. Evidence
from Busia district, where there were positive test score
gains overall, that boys also experienced signiﬁcant test
score gains even though they were ineligible for the schol-
arship, together with the gains among low-scoring girls,
suggests positive externalities to student effort, either di-
rectly among students or through the program’s impact on
teacher effort. Such externalities within the classroom
would have important policy implications. Human capital
externalities in production are often cited as a justiﬁcation
for government education subsidies (Lucas, 1988). How-
ever, recent empirical studies ﬁnd that human capital exter-
nalities in the labor market are small, if they exist at all
(Acemoglu & Angrist, 2000; Moretti, 2004). To the extent
that the results from this program generalize, the evidence
for positive classroom externalities creates a new rationale
for merit scholarships, as well as for public education
subsidies more broadly.
Many educators remain skeptical about merit scholar-
ships. First, some argue that their beneﬁts ﬂow dispropor-
tionately to well-off pupils, exacerbating inequality (Or-
ﬁeld, 2002). Second, while standard economic models
suggest incentives should increase individual study effort,
some educators note that alternative theories from psychol-
ogy argue that extrinsic rewards interfere with intrinsic
motivation and could thus reduce effort in some circum-
stances (for a discussion in economics, see Benabou &
Tirole, 2003). A weaker version of this view is that incen-
tives lead to better performance in the short run but have
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ing intrinsic motivation.1 A third set of concerns relates to
multi-tasking and the potential for gaming the incentive
system. Binder, Ganderton, and Hutchens (2002) argue that
while scholarship eligibility in new Mexico increased stu-
dent grades, the number of completed credit hours fell,
suggesting that students took fewer courses to keep their
grades up. Beyond course load selection, merit award in-
centives could potentially produce test cramming and even
cheating rather than real learning.2
Surveys of students in our Kenyan data provide no evidence
that program incentives weakened intrinsic motivation to learn
or led to gaming or cheating. The program did not lead to
adverse changes in student attitudes toward school or increase
extra test preparation tutoring; also, program school test score
gains remained large in the year following the competition,
after incentives were removed. This suggests that the test score
improvements reﬂect real learning.
This paper is related to a number of recent papers on
merit awards in education. In the context of tertiary educa-
tion, Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2003) used
an experimental design to estimate the effect of a ﬁnancial
incentive on the performance of Dutch university students.
They estimated large positive effects concentrated among
academically strong students. Initial results from a large
experimental study among Canadian university freshmen
suggest no overall exam score gains during the ﬁrst year of
a merit award program, although there is evidence of gains
for some girls (Angrist, Lang, & Oreopoulos, 2006). As
noted, U.S. scholarships have stimulated students to get
better grades but to take less ambitious course loads (Binder
et al., 2002; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2002; Cornwell,
Lee, & Mustard, 2003).
Angrist et al. (2002) and Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer
(2006) show that a Colombian program that provided
vouchers for private secondary school to students condi-
tional on maintaining satisfactory academic performance
led to academic gains. They note that the impact of these
vouchers may have been due not only to expanding school
choice but also to the incentives associated with conditional
renewal of scholarships, but they are unable to disentangle
these two channels.
The work closest to ours is that of Angrist and Lavy
(2002), who examine a scholarship program that provided
cash grants for performance on matriculation exams in
twenty Israeli secondary schools. In a pilot program that
randomized awards among schools, students offered the
merit award were 6 to 8 percentage points more likely to
pass exams than comparison students. A second pilot that
randomized awards at the individual level within a different
set of Israeli schools did not produce signiﬁcant impacts.
This could be because program impact varies with context,
or possibly because positive within-school spillovers made
any program effects in the second pilot difﬁcult to pick up.
Our study differs from the Israeli one in several ways,
including our estimation of externality impacts, larger
school sample size, and richer data on school attendance and
student attitudes and time use, which allow us to better
illuminate potential mechanisms for the test score results.
II. The Girls’ Scholarship Program
A. Primary and Secondary Education in Kenya
Schooling in Kenya consists of eight years of primary
school followed by four years of secondary school. While
approximately 85% of primary-school-age children in west-
ern Kenya are enrolled in school (Central Bureau of Statis-
tics, 1999), there are high dropout rates in grades 5, 6, and
7, and only about one-third of students ﬁnish primary
school. Dropout rates are especially high for girls.3
Secondary school admission depends on performance on
the grade 8 Kenya Certiﬁcate of Primary Education (KCPE)
exam. To prepare, students in grades 4 to 8 take standard-
ized year-end exams in English, geography/history, mathe-
matics, science, and Swahili. They must pay a fee to take the
exam, US$1 to $2 depending on the year. Kenyan district
education ofﬁces have a well-established system of exam
supervision, with outside monitors for the exams and teach-
ers from the school itself playing no role in supervision and
grading. Exam monitors document and punish any instances
of cheating and report these cases to the district ofﬁce.
The Kenyan central government pays the salaries of
almost all teachers, but when the scholarship program we
study was introduced, primary schools charged school fees
to cover their nonteacher costs, including textbooks for teach-
ers, chalk, and classroom maintenance. These fees averaged
approximately US$6.40 (KSh 500) per family each year.4 In
practice, these fees set a benchmark for bargaining between
parents and headmasters, but most parents did not pay the
1 Early experimental psychology research supported the idea that reward-
based incentives increase student effort (Skinner, 1958). However, labo-
ratory research conducted in the 1970s studied behavior before and after
pupils received “extrinsic” motivational rewards and found that external
rewards produced negative impacts in some situations (Deci, 1971;
Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973).
Later laboratory research attempting to quantify the effect on intrinsic
motivation has yielded mixed conclusions: Cameron, Banko, and Pierce
(2001) conducted meta-studies of over 100 experiments and found that the
negative effects of external rewards were limited and could be overcome
in some settings such as high-interest tasks. But in a similar meta-study,
Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) conclude that there are often negative
effects of rewards on task interest and satisfaction. Some economists also
argue that the impact of incentives depends on context and framing
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; Feher & Ga ¨chter, 2002; Fehr & List, 2004).
2 Similarly, after the Georgia HOPE college scholarship was introduced,
average SAT scores for high school seniors rose almost 40 points, but
there was a 2% reduction in completed college credits, a 12% decrease in
full course-load completion, and a 22% increase in summer school
enrollment (Cornwell et al., 2003).
3 For instance, girls in our baseline sample of pupils in grade 6 (in
comparison schools) had a dropout rate of 9.9% from early 2001 through
early 2002, versus 7.3% for boys.
4 One US dollar was worth 78.5 Kenyan shillings (KSh) in January 2002
(http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 438full fee. In addition to this fee were fees for school supplies,
certain textbooks, uniforms, and some activities, such as
taking exams. The project we study was introduced in part
to assist the families of high-achieving girls to cover these
costs.5
B. Project Description and Time Line
The Girls’Scholarship Program (GSP) was carried out by
a Dutch nongovernmental organization (NGO) ICS Africa,
in two rural Kenyan districts, Busia and Teso. Busia is
mainly populated by a Bantu-speaking ethnic group (Luh-
yas) with agricultural traditions, while Teso is populated
primarily by a Nilotic-speaking group (Tesos) with pasto-
ralist traditions.
Of the 127 sample primary schools, 64 were invited to
participate in the program in March 2001 (table 1, panel A).
The randomization ﬁrst stratiﬁed schools by district, and by
administrative divisions within district,6 and also stratiﬁed
them by participation in a past program, which provided
classroom ﬂip charts.7 Randomization into program and
comparison groups was then carried out within each stratum
using a computer random number generator. In line with the
initial stratiﬁcation, we often present results separately by
district.
The NGO awarded scholarships to the highest-scoring
15% of grade 6 girls in the program schools within each
district (110 girls in Busia and 90 in Teso). Each district
(Busia and Teso) had separate tests and competitions for the
merit award.8 Scholarship winners were chosen based on
their total tests score on districtwide exams administered by
the Ministry of Education across ﬁve subjects. Schools
varied considerably in the number of winners: 56% of
program schools (36 of 64 schools) had at least one 2001
winner, and among schools with at least one winner, there
was an average of 5.5 winners per school.
The scholarship program provided winning grade 6 girls
with an award for the next two academic years. In each year,
the award consisted of a grant of US$6.40 (KSh 500) to
cover the winner’s school fees, paid to her school; a grant of
US$12.80 (KSh 1,000) for school supplies, paid directly to
the girl’s family; and public recognition at a school awards
assembly held for students, parents, teachers, and local
government ofﬁcials. These were full scholarships and were
substantial considering that Kenyan GDP per capita is only
around US$400 and most households in the two districts
have incomes below the Kenyan average. Although the
program did not include explicit monitoring to make sure
that parents purchased school supplies for their daughter,
the public presentation in a school assembly likely generated
5 In late 2001, President Daniel Arap Moi announced a national ban on
primary school fees, but the central government did not provide alterna-
tive sources of school funding, and other policymakers made unclear
statements on whether schools could impose “voluntary” fees. Schools
varied in the extent to which they continued collecting fees in 2002, but
this is difﬁcult to quantitatively assess. Moi’s successor, Mwai Kibaki,
eliminated primary school fees in early 2003. This time the policy was
implemented consistently, in part because the government made substitute
payments to schools to replace local fees. Our study focuses on program
impacts in 2001 and 2002, before primary school fees were eliminated by
the 2003 reform.
6 Divisions are subsets of districts, with eight divisions within our
sample.
7 All GSP schools had previously participated in an evaluation of a ﬂip
chart program and are a subset of that sample. These schools are repre-
sentative of local primary schools along most dimensions but exclude
some of the most advantaged as well as some of the worst off. See
Glewwe, Kremer, Moulin, et al. (2004) for details on the sample and
results. The ﬂip chart program did not affect any measures of educational
performance (not shown). Stratiﬁcation means there are balanced numbers
of ﬂip chart and non-ﬂip-chart schools across the GSP program and
comparison groups.
8 Student incentive impacts could potentially differ in programs where
the top students within each school (rather than district-wide) win awards.
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY SAMPLE SIZES
Busia District Teso District
Program Schools Comparison Schools Program Schools Comparison Schools
Panel A: Number of schools 34 35 30 28
Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 1 Cohort 2
Program Comparison Program Comparison Program Comparison Program Comparison
Panel B: Baseline sample
Number of girls 744 767 898 889 571 523 672 572
Number of boys 803 845 945 1,024 602 503 739 631
Panel C: Intention to treat (ITT) sample
Number of girls 614 599 463 430 356 397 399 344
Number of boys 652 648 492 539 385 389 508 445
Panel D: Restricted sample
Number of girls 588 597 449 427 304 342 380 333
Number of boys 607 648 470 531 328 334 484 436
Panel E: Longitudinal sample
Number of girls 360 408 — — 182 203 — —
Number of boys 398 453 — — 205 219 — —
Notes: The baseline sample refers to all students who were registered in grade 6 (cohort 1) or grade 5 (cohort 2) in January 2001. The ITT sample consists of all baseline sample students with either 2001 (cohort
1) or 2002 (cohort 2) test scores. The restricted sample consists of ITT sample students in schools that did not pull out of the program, with average school test scores in 2000. The longitudinal sample contains
those cohort 1 restricted sample students who took the 2000 test. A dash indicates that the data are unavailable (for instance, cohort 2 in not included in the longitudinal sample).
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 439some community pressure to do so.9Since many parents would
not otherwise have fully paid fees, schools with winners
beneﬁted to some degree from the award money paid directly
to the school.
Two cohorts of grade 6 girls competed for the scholar-
ships. Girls registered for grade 6 in January 2001 in
program schools were the ﬁrst eligible cohort (cohort 1),
and those registered for grade 5 in January 2001 were the
second cohort (cohort 2), competing in 2002. In January
2001, 11,728 students in grades 5 and 6 were registered;
these students make up the baseline sample (table 1, panel
B). Most cohort 1 students had taken the usual end-of-year
grade 5 exams in November 2000, and these are used as
baseline test scores in the analysis.10 Because the NGO
restricted award eligibility to girls already enrolled in pro-
gram schools in January 2001 before the program was
announced, students had no incentive to transfer schools; in
fact, incoming transfer rates were low and nearly identical
in program and comparison schools (4.4% into program
schools and 4.8% into comparison schools).
In March 2001, after random assignment of schools into
program and comparison groups, NGO staff met with
school headmasters to invite schools to participate; each of
the schools chose to participate. Headmasters were asked to
relay information about the program to parents in a school
assembly, and in September and October, the NGO held
additional community meetings to reinforce knowledge
about program rules in advance of the November 2001
district exams. After these meetings, enumerators began
collecting school attendance data during unannounced vis-
its. District exams were given in Busia and Teso in Novem-
ber 2001. The baseline sample students who took the 2001
test make up the intention to treat (ITT) sample (table 1).
As expected, the baseline 2000 test score is a very strong
predictor of being a top 15% performer on the 2001 test.
Students below the median baseline test score had almost no
chance of winning the scholarship. In particular, the odds of
winning were only 3% for the bottom quartile of girls in the
baseline test distribution and 5% for the second quartile,
compared to 13% and 55% in the top two baseline quartiles.
Children whose parents had more schooling were also
more likely to be in the top 15% of test performers: average
years of parent education are approximately one year
greater for scholarship winners (10.7 years) than losers (9.6
years), and this difference is signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence.
Note, however, that the link between parent education and
child test scores is no stronger in program schools than in
comparison schools. There is no statistically signiﬁcant
difference between winners and nonwinners in terms of
household ownership of iron roofs or latrines (regressions
not shown), however, suggesting a weaker link with house-
hold wealth.
Ofﬁcial exams were again held in late 2002 in Busia. The
government cancelled the 2002 exams in Teso district be-
cause of concerns about possible disruptions in the run-up to
the December 2002 national elections, so the NGO instead
administered its own standardized exams modeled on gov-
ernment tests in February 2003 after the election. Thus, the
second cohort of winners was chosen in Busia based on the
ofﬁcial 2002 district exam, while Teso winners were chosen
based on the NGO exam. In this second round, 67% of
program schools (43 of 64) had at least one winner, an
increase over 2001, and in all, 75% of program schools had
at least one winner in either 2001 or 2002.
Enumerators again visited all schools during 2002 to
conduct unannounced attendance checks and administer
questionnaires to students, collecting information on their
study effort, habits, and attitudes toward school. This stu-
dent survey indicates that most girls understood program
rules, with 88 percent of cohort 1 and 2 girls claiming to
have heard of the program. Girls had somewhat better
knowledge about program rules governing eligibility and
winning than did boys: girls were 9.4 percentage points
more likely than boys to know that “only girls are eligible
for the scholarship” (84% for girls versus 74% for boys),
although the vast majority of boys knew they were ineligi-
ble.11 Girls were very likely (70%) to report that their
parents had mentioned the program to them, suggesting
some parental encouragement.
III. Data and Sample Construction
In this section we provide information about the data set
used in this paper and discuss program implementation, in
particular examining the implications of sample attrition.
We then compare characteristics of program and compari-
son group schools.
A. Test Score Data and Student Surveys
Test score data were obtained from the District Education
Ofﬁces (DEO) in each program district. Test scores were
normalized in each district such that scores in the compar-
ison sample (girls and boys together) are distributed with
mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The 2002 surveys collected information on household
characteristics and study habits and attitudes from all cohort
9 It is impossible to determine exactly how the award was spent without
detailed household expenditure data, which we lack. However, our qual-
itative interviews revealed that some winning girls reported that purchases
were made from the scholarship money on school supplies such as math
kits, notebooks, and pencils.
10 Unfortunately, the 2000 baseline exam data for cohort 2 (when they
were in grade 4) are incomplete, especially in Teso district, where many
schools did not offer an exam, and thus baseline comparisons focus on
cohort 1.
11 Note that some measurement error is likely for these survey responses,
since rather than being ﬁlled in by an enumerator who individually
interviewed students, the surveys were ﬁlled in by students themselves,
with the enumerator explaining the questionnaire to the class as a whole;
thus, values of 100% are unlikely even if all students had perfect program
knowledge.
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survey. This means that, unfortunately, survey information
is missing for pupils absent from school on that day. The
collection of the survey in 2002, after one year of the
program, is unlikely to be a severe problem for many
important predetermined household characteristics (e.g.,
parent schooling, ethnic identity, children in the household),
which are not affected by the program. When examining
impacts of the scholarship program on school-related be-
haviors that could have been affected by the scholarship, we
examine the effects on cohort 2, who were administered the
survey in the year that they were competing for the schol-
arship.
Finally, school participation data are based on four unan-
nounced checks collected by NGO enumerators, one in
September or October 2001 and one in each of the three
terms of the 2002 academic year. We use the unannounced
check data rather than ofﬁcial school attendance registers,
since registers are often unreliable.
B. Community Reaction to the Program in Busia and Teso
Districts
Community reaction to the program and school-level
attrition varied substantially between the two districts where
the program was carried out. Historically, Tesos are education-
ally disadvantaged relative to Luhyas: in our data, Teso district
parents have 0.2 years less schooling than Busia parents on
average. There is also a tradition of suspicion of outsiders in
Teso, and this has at times led to misunderstandings with
NGOs there. A government report noted that indigenous reli-
gious beliefs, traditional taboos, and witchcraft practices re-
main stronger in Teso than in Busia (Were, 1986).
Events that occurred during the study period appear to
have interacted in an adverse way with these preexisting
factors in Teso district. In June 2001 lightning struck and
severely damaged a Teso primary school, killing 7 students
and injuring 27 others. Although that school was not in the
scholarship program, the NGO had been involved with
another assistance program there. Some community mem-
bers associated the lightning strike with the NGO, and this
appears to have led some schools to pull out of the girls’
scholarship program. Of 58 Teso sample schools, 5 pulled
out immediately following the lightning strike, as did a
school located in Busia with a substantial ethnic Teso
population.12 Three of the 6 schools that pulled out were
treatment schools and 3 were comparison. The intention to
treat (ITT) sample students whose schools did not pull out,
and whose schools had baseline average school test scores
for 2000, comprise the restricted sample (table 1).
Structured interviews conducted during June 2003 with a
representative sample of 64 teachers in 18 program schools
conﬁrm the stark differences in program reception across
Busia and Teso districts. When teachers were asked to rate
local parental support for the program, 90% of Busia teach-
ers claimed that parents were either “very” or “somewhat
positive,” but the analogous rate in Teso was only 58%, and
this difference across districts is signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁ-
dence. Thus, although the monetary value of the award was
identical everywhere, local social prestige associated with
winning may have differed between Busia and Teso.
C. Sample Attrition
Approximately 65% of the baseline sample students took
the 2001 exams. These students are the main sample for the
ITT analysis. Not surprisingly, given the reported differ-
ences in the response to the scholarship program, we ﬁnd
differences in sample attrition patterns across Busia and
Teso districts. In Busia, differences between program and
comparison schools are small and not statistically signiﬁ-
cant: for cohort 1, 83% of girls (81% of boys) in program
schools and 78% of girls (77% of boys) in comparison
schools took the 2001 exam (table 2, panel A). Among
cohort 2 students in Busia, there is again almost no differ-
ence between program and comparison school students in
the proportion who took the 2002 exam (52% versus 48%
for girls and 52% versus 53% for boys; table 2, panel C).
There is more attrition by 2002 as students drop out, transfer
schools, or decide not to take the exam.
Attrition patterns in Teso schools are strikingly different.
For cohort 1, 62% of girls in program schools (64% of boys)
took the 2001 exam, but the rate for comparison school girls
is much higher, at 76% (and for boys 77%; table 2, panelA).
Attrition gaps across program and comparison schools appear
in cohort 2, although these are smaller than for cohort 1.13
In addition to the six schools that pulled out of the
program after the lightning strike, ﬁve other schools (three
in Teso and two in Busia) had incomplete exam scores for
2000, 2001, or 2002; the remaining schools make up the
restricted sample. There was similarly differential attrition
between program and comparison students to this restricted
sample (table 2, panel B). Cohort 1 students in the restricted
sample who also had both 2000 and 2001 individual test
scores comprise the longitudinal sample (table 1, panel E).
To better understand attrition patterns, we use the base-
line test scores from 2000 to examine which students were
more likely to attrit. Nonparametric Fan locally weighted
regressions display the proportion of cohort 1 students
taking the 2001 exam as a function of their baseline 2000
test score in Busia and Teso (ﬁgure 1). These plots indicate
that Busia students across all levels of initial academic
ability had a similar likelihood of taking the 2001 exam.
Although, theoretically, the introduction of a scholarship
could have induced poor but high-achieving students to take
the exam in program schools, we do not ﬁnd strong
12 Moreover, one girl in Teso who won the ICS scholarship in 2001 later
refused the scholarship award, reportedly because of negative views
toward the NGO.
13 Attrition in Teso in 2002 was lower in part because the NGO
administered its own exam there in early 2003 and students did not need
to pay a fee to take the exam, unlike the 2001 government test.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 441evidence of such a pattern in either Busia or Teso. Rather,
students with low initial achievement are somewhat more
likely to take the 2001 exam in Busia program schools
relative to comparison schools, and this difference is signif-
icant in the extreme left tail of the baseline 2000 distribu-
tion. This slightly lower attrition rate among low-achieving
Busia program school students most likely leads to a down-
ward bias (toward zero) in estimated treatment effects, but
any bias in Busia appears likely to be small.14
In contrast, not only were attrition rates high and unbal-
anced across treatment groups in Teso, but signiﬁcantly
more high-achieving students took the 2001 exam in com-
parison schools relative to program schools, and this is
likely to bias estimated program impacts downward in Teso
(ﬁgure 1, panels C and D). Among high-ability cohort 1
girls in Teso with a score of at least 0.1 standard devia-
tions on the baseline 2000 exam, comparison school stu-
dents were almost 14 percentage points more likely to take
the 2001 exam than program school students, and this
difference is statistically signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence; the
comparable gap among high-ability Busia girls is near zero
(not shown). There are similar gaps between comparison
and program schools for boys. When boys and girls in Teso
are pooled, program school students who did not take the
2001 exam scored 0.50 standard deviations lower on aver-
age at baseline (on the 2000 test) than those who took the
2001 exams, but the difference is far less at 0.37 standard
deviations in the Teso comparison schools. These attrition
patterns in Teso are in part due to the fact that several of the
Teso schools that pulled out had relatively high baseline
2000 test scores. The average baseline score of students in
schools that pulled out of the program was 0.20 standard
deviations in contrast to an average baseline score of 0.01
standard deviations for students in schools that did not pull
out of the program, and the estimated difference in differ-
ences is statistically signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence (regres-
sion not shown).
D. Characteristics of the Program and Comparison Groups
We use 2002 pupil survey data to compare program and
comparison students and ﬁnd that the randomization was
largely successful in creating groups comparable along
observable dimensions. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in
parent education, proportion of ethnic Tesos, or the owner-
ship of an iron roof across Busia program and comparison
schools (table 3, panel A). Household characteristics are
also broadly similar across program and comparison schools
in the Teso main sample, but there are certain differences,
including lower likelihood of owning an iron roof among
program students (table 3, panel B). This may in part be due
to the differential attrition across Teso program and com-
parison schools.
Baseline test score distributions provide further evidence
on the comparability of the program and comparison
groups. Formally, in the Busia longitudinal sample, we
14 Pupils with high baseline 2000 test scores were much more likely to
win an award in 2001, as expected, with the likelihood of winning rising
monotonically and rapidly with the baseline score. However, the propor-
tion of cohort 1 program school girls taking the 2001 exam as a function
of the baseline score does not correspond closely to the likelihood of
winning an award in either district (not shown). This pattern, together with
the very high rate of 2001 test taking for boys and for comparison
schoolgirls, indicates that competing for the NGO award was not the main
reason most students took the test.
TABLE 2.—PROPORTION OF BASELINE SAMPLE STUDENTS IN OTHER SAMPLES
Busia District Teso District
Program Comparison Difference (s.e.) Program Comparison Difference (s.e.)
Panel A: Cohort 1 in ITT sample








Panel B: Cohort 1 in restricted sample








Panel C: Cohort 2 in ITT sample








Panel D: Cohort 2 in restricted sample








Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
The denominator for these proportions consists of the baseline sample, all grade 6 (cohort 1) or grade 5 (cohort 2) students who were registered in school in January 2001. Cohort 2 data for Busia district students
are based on the 2002 Busia district exams, which were administered as scheduled in late 2002. Cohort 2 data for Teso district students are based on the February 2003 NGO exam.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 442cannot reject the hypothesis that mean 2000 test scores are
the same across program and comparison schools for either
girls or boys, or the equality of the distributions using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value  0.32 for cohort 1
Busia girls). In Teso, where several schools dropped out, the
hypothesis of equality between program and comparison
baseline test scores distributions is rejected at moderate
conﬁdence levels (p-value  0.07 for cohort 1 Teso girls).
We discuss the implications of this difference in Teso below.
IV. Empirical Strategy and Results
We focus on reduced-form estimation of the program
impact on test scores. To better understand possible mech-
anisms underlying test score impacts, we also estimate
program impacts on several channels, including measures of
teacher and student effort. The main estimation equation is
TESTist    1TREATs  X ist1  s  εist. (1)
TESTist is the normalized test score for student i in school s
in the year of the competition (2001 for cohort 1 students
and 2002 for cohort 2 students).15 TREATs is the program
school indicator, and the coefﬁcient 1 captures the average
program impact on the population targeted for program
15 Test scores were normalized separately by district and cohort; differ-
ent exams were offered each year by district.
FIGURE 1.—PROPORTION OF BASELINE STUDENTS WITH 2001 TEST SCORES BY BASELINE (2000) TEST SCORE,C OHORT 1
(NONPARAMETRIC FAN LOCALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSIONS)
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Vertical line represents the minimum winning score in 2001.
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Vertical line represents the minimum winning score in 2001.
Note: The ﬁgures present nonparametric Fan locally weighted regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.7. The sample used in these ﬁgures includes students in the baseline sample who
have 2000 test scores.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 443incentives. Xist is a vector that includes the average school
baseline (2000) test score when we use the restricted sample
and denotes the individual baseline score for the longitudi-
nal sample, as well as any other controls. The error term
consists of s, a common school-level error component
perhaps capturing common local or headmaster character-
istics, and εist, which captures unobserved student ability or
idiosyncratic shocks. In practice, we cluster the error term at
the school level and include cohort ﬁxed effects, as well as
district ﬁxed effects in the regressions pooling Busia and
Teso.
A. Test Score Impacts
In the analysis, we focus on the intention to treat (ITT)
sample, restricted sample, and longitudinal sample. The ITT
sample includes all students who were in the program and
comparison schools in 2000 and who had test scores in 2001
(for cohort 1) or 2002 (cohort 2). The restricted sample
consists of students in schools that did not pull out of the
program and also had average baseline 2000 test scores, and
it contains data for 91% of the schools in the ITT sample.
The longitudinal sample contains the restricted sample co-
hort 1 students who also have individual baseline test
scores.16 We ﬁrst present estimated program effects among
girls in the ITT sample and then move on to the restricted
and longitudinal samples. We then turn to results among
boys and robustness checks.
ITT sample. The program raised test scores by 0.19
standard deviations for girls in Busia and Teso districts
(table 4, panel A, column 1). These effects were strongest
among students in Busia where the program increased
scores by 0.27 standard deviations, signiﬁcant at the 90%
level. In Teso, the effects were positive, an increase in 0.09
standard deviations, but not statistically signiﬁcant. These
regressions do not include the mean school 2000 test control
as an explanatory variable, however, since those data are
missing for several schools, and thus standard errors are
large in these speciﬁcations.17
16 Recall that test scores in 2000 are missing for most cohort 2 students
in Teso district because many schools there did not offer grade 4 exams,
so the longitudinal sample contains only cohort 1 students.
17 Program effects in the ITT sample were similar for both cohorts in the
year they competed: the program effect for cohort 1 girls in 2001 is 0.22
standard deviations (standard error 0.13), and the effect for cohort 2 in
2002 is 0.16 (standard error 0.12, regressions not shown).







Panel A: Busia District
Age in 2001 13.5 13.4 0.0 13.9 13.7 0.2
(0.1) (0.2)
Father’s education (years) 10.8 10.4 0.4 10.2 9.9 0.3
(0.4) (0.3)
Mother’s education (years) 9.2 8.8 0.4 8.3 8.1 0.2
(0.3) (0.4)
Proportion ethnic Teso 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.01
(0.03) (0.03)
Iron roof ownership 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.72 0.75 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Test score 2000—baseline sample (cohort 1 only) 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.07
(0.18) (0.19)
Test score 2000—restricted sample (cohort 1 only) 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.28 0.13
(0.19) (0.19)
Panel B: Teso District
Age in 2001 14.0 13.8 0.20 14.1 14.1 0.05
(0.18) (0.18)
Father’s education (years) 11.0 10.8 0.2 10.0 10.0 0.0
(0.4) (0.4)
Mother’s education (years) 8.5 8.4 0.1 7.5 8.2 0.7
(0.5) (0.5)
Proportion ethnic Teso 0.84 0.80 0.05 0.85 0.80 0.05
(0.05) (0.04)
Iron roof ownership 0.58 0.67 0.09** 0.49 0.59 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
Test score 2000—baseline sample (cohort 1 only) 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.09
(0.18) (0.17)
Test score 2000—restricted sample (cohort 1 only) 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.25 0.05
(0.19) (0.17)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Sample includes all baseline sample students with the relevant data. Data are from the 2002 student questionnaire and from Busia District and Teso District Education Ofﬁce records. The sample size is 7,401
questionnaires: 65% of the baseline sample in Busia and 60% in Teso (the remainder had either left school by the 2002 survey or were not present in school on the survey day).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 444To limit possible bias due to differential sample attrition
across program groups, especially in Teso, we construct
nonparametric bounds on program effects using Lee’s
(2002) trimming method. In the pooled Busia and Teso
sample, bounds range from 0.16 to 0.22 standard devia-
tions—relatively tightly bounded effects. In Busia, the
bounds are exactly the nontrimmed program estimate of
0.27 due to the lack of differential attrition across groups.
The upper and lower bounds of the program effect in Teso
are very wide, ranging from 0.17 to 0.23. Under the
bounding assumptions in Lee (2002), we thus cannot reach
deﬁnitive conclusions about the program effect in Teso
district.
In Teso, we can also focus on impacts for cohort 2 girls
alone, since attrition rates are similar across program and
comparison schools for this group (table 2). Yet the esti-
mated impact remains small in magnitude (estimate 0.04
standard deviations, standard error 0.16, regression not
shown). Whichever way one interprets the Teso results—
unreliable estimates due to attrition, no program impacts, or
a combination of both—the program was clearly less suc-
cessful in Teso at a minimum in the sense that fewer schools
chose to take part.
Restricted sample. Among restricted sample girls, there
is an overall impact of 0.18 standard deviations (standard
TABLE 4.—PROGRAM TEST SCORE IMPACTS,C OHORTS 1 AND 2G IRLS
Dependent Variable: Normalized Test Scores from 2001 and 2002
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ITT sample
Program school 0.19* 0.27* 0.09
(0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Sample size 3,602 2,106 1,496
R2 0.01 0.02 0.00
Mean of dependent variable 0.06 0.03 0.12
Lee lower bound 0.16 0.27* 0.17
(0.11) (0.16) (0.14)
Lee upper bound 0.22** 0.27* 0.23*
(0.11) (0.16) (0.13)
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Restricted sample
Program school 0.18 0.15*** 0.25*** 0.01
(0.12) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Mean school test score, 2000 0.76*** 0.80*** 0.69***
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Sample size 3,420 3,420 2,061 1,359
R2 0.01 0.29 0.34 0.22
Mean of dependent variable 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.11
Lee lower bound 0.09 0.09 0.25*** 0.17**
(0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Lee upper bound 0.25** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.17***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel C: Longitudinal sample
Program school 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.01
(0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.10)
Individual test score, 2000 0.80*** 0.83*** 0.74***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Sample size 1,153 1,153 768 385
R2 0.01 0.62 0.65 0.58
Mean of dependent variable 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09
Lee lower bound 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.19**
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09)
Lee upper bound 0.47*** 0.25*** 0.29*** 0.16
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Notes:
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS regressions; Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations in the same school but not across schools. District ﬁxed effects are included in
panelAregression 1 and panels B and C in regressions 1 and 2, and cohort ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Test scores were normalized such that comparison group test scores had mean 0 and standard
deviation 1.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 445error 0.12, table 4, panel B, regression 1), which decreases
slightly to 0.15 standard deviations but becomes statistically
signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence when the mean school 2000
test score is included as an explanatory variable. The aver-
age program impact for Busia district girls in the restricted
sample is 0.25 standard deviations (standard error 0.07,
signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁdence—regression 3),18 much larger
than the estimated Teso effect, at only 0.01 standard devi-
ations (regression 4).
In the pooled Busia and Teso sample, the Lee bounds
range from 0.09 to 0.21 standard deviations, indicating an
overall positive effect of the program. In Busia alone, there
was very little differential attrition between the treatment
and the comparison groups to the restricted sample; thus, the
upper and lower bounds are still exactly 0.25 standard
deviations. The upper and lower bounds in Teso, however,
are very wide, ranging from 0.17 to 0.17.
Cohort 1 longitudinal sample. The program raised test
scores by 0.19 standard deviations on average among lon-
gitudinal sample girls in Busia and Teso district (table 4,
panel C, regression 1). The average impact falls to 0.12
standard deviations (standard error 0.09, regression 2) when
the individual baseline 2000 test score is included as an
explanatory variable. The 2000 test score is strongly related
to the 2001 test score as expected (point estimate 0.80,
standard error 0.02).
Disaggregation by district again yields a large estimated
impact for Busia and a much smaller one for Teso. The
estimated impact for Busia district is 0.19 standard devia-
tions, standard error 0.12 (table 4, panel C, regression 3),
while the estimated program impact for Teso district is near
zero at 0.01 standard deviations (regression 4), but it is
again difﬁcult to reject a wide variety of hypotheses regard-
ing effects in Teso due to attrition: the bounds for girls in
Teso district range from 0.19 to 0.16 standard deviations.
The Lee bounds for Busia and Teso taken together range
from 0.03 to 0.25 standard deviations, while in Busia, the
bounds are again relatively tight due to minimal differential
attrition across groups.
The test score distribution in program schools shifts
markedly to the right for cohort 1 Busia girls (ﬁgure 2, panel
A), while there is a much smaller visible shift in Teso (panel
C).19 The vertical lines in each ﬁgure indicate the minimum
score necessary to win an award in each district.
Note that the ITT analysis leads to larger estimated average
program impacts in Busia and Teso districts (0.19 standard
deviations; table 4, panelA, regression 1) than in the main and
longitudinal samples (0.15 standard deviations and 0.12 stan-
dard deviations, respectively). This is consistent with the hy-
pothesized downward sample attrition bias noted above.
In sum, the academic performance effects of competing for
the scholarship are large among girls. To illustrate the magni-
tude with previous ﬁndings from Kenya, the average test score
for grade 7 students who take a grade 6 exam is approximately
one standard deviation higher than the average score for grade
6 students (Glewwe, Kremer, & Moulin, 1997). Thus, the
estimated average program effect for girls roughly corresponds
to an additional 0.2 grade worth of primary school learning.
Test score effects for boys. There is some evidence that
the program raised test scores among boys, though by less
than among girls. Being in a scholarship program school is
associated with a 0.08 standard deviation gain in test scores
on average among boys in 2001 for the Busia and Teso ITT
sample (table 5, panel A, regression 1). The gain in Busia,
0.10 standard deviations (regression 2), is larger than in
Teso, at 0.04 standard deviations (regression 3), though neither
of these effects is signiﬁcant at traditional conﬁdence levels.
The Lee bounds for boys reveal familiar patterns: in the pooled
Busia and Teso sample, bound range from 0.02 to 0.12 stan-
dard deviations, but among Busia boys, the bound are tight,
equal to 0.10, while among Teso boys, bounds are wide, from
0.25 to 0.19 standard deviations.
Among restricted sample boys, there is an overall impact
of 0.05 standard deviations (table 5, panel B, regression 1).
In Busia, the program increased test scores among boys by
0.15 standard deviations, statistically signiﬁcant at 90%
conﬁdence (regression 3)—roughly 60% of the size of the
analogous effect for Busia girls, at 0.25 standard devia-
tions—while the results for Teso remain close to zero. In the
pooled Busia and Teso sample, the Lee bounds are wide
(ranging from 0.06 to 0.17 standard deviations), but
among Busia boys, the bound range from 0.09 to 0.18
standard deviations.Among Teso boys, the bounds are again
very wide, from 0.25 to 0.18 standard deviations.
In the cohort 1 longitudinal sample, the overall impact is
0.09 standard deviations (table 5, panel C, regression 1), and
this rises to 0.14 standard deviations (standard error 0.06,
regression 2) and becomes statistically signiﬁcant at 99%
conﬁdence when the individual baseline test score is in-
cluded as an explanatory variable. Effects are again concen-
trated in Busia (regression 3) with smaller, nonsigniﬁcant
effects among Teso boys (regression 4). Longitudinal sam-
ple Busia boys show some visible gains (ﬁgure 2, panel B).
Although average program effects among boys, who were
not eligible for the scholarship, are much smaller than
among girls in the ITT and restricted samples, we cannot
reject equal treatment effects for girls and boys in the
longitudinal sample (regression not shown). In section IVB,
we discuss possible mechanisms for effects among boys,
including our leading explanations of higher teacher atten-
dance and within-classroom externalities among students.
Heterogeneous impacts by academic ability. We next
test whether test score effects differ as a function of baseline
18 For Busia restricted sample girls, impacts are somewhat larger for
mathematics, science, and geography/history than for English and Swa-
hili, but differences across subjects are not statistically signiﬁcant (regres-
sion not shown).
19 These ﬁgures use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.7.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 446academic performance, focusing the analysis on the cohort 1
longitudinal sample (who have preprogram 2000 test data).
The average treatment effects for girls across the four baseline
test quartiles (from top to bottom) are 0.00, 0.23, 0.13, and 0.12
standard deviations, respectively (table 6, panel A, regression
1), and we cannot reject the hypothesis that treatment effects
are equal in all quartiles (F-test p-value  0.31). Although
estimating the program effect separately for each quartile
reduces statistical power somewhat, the positive and large
estimated test score gains among girls with little to no chance
of winning the award are suggestive evidence for positive
externalities.As expected, effects are larger among Busia girls,
at 0.08, 0.29, 0.19, and 0.23 standard deviations, with the
largest gains in the second quartile: those students striving for
the top 15% winning threshold (regression 2). Effects for Teso
students are again close to zero.
Evidence on program gains throughout the baseline test
score distribution is presented using a nonparametric ap-
proach in ﬁgure 3, including bootstrapped 95% conﬁdence
bands on the treatment effects. Once again, treatment effects
are visibly larger among Busia students.
Robustness checks. Estimates are similar when individ-
ual characteristics collected in the 2002 student survey (i.e.,
student age, parent education, and household asset owner-
ship) are included as additional explanatory variables.20
20 These are not included in the main speciﬁcations because they were
collected only for those present in the school on the day of survey
administration, thus reducing the sample size and changing the composi-
tion of students. Results are also unchanged when school average socio-
economic measures are included as controls (not shown).
FIGURE 2.—COMPETITION YEAR TEST SCORE DISTRIBUTION (COHORT 1 IN 2001 AND COHORT 2 IN 2002)
ITT SAMPLE
(NONPARAMETRIC KERNEL DENSITIES)
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Note: These ﬁgures present nonparametric kernel densities using an Epanechnikov kernel.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 447Interactions of the program indicator with these character-
istics are not statistically signiﬁcant at traditional conﬁdence
levels for any characteristic (regressions not shown), imply-
ing that test scores did not increase signiﬁcantly more on
average for students from higher-socioeconomic-status
households.21 Theoretically, spillover beneﬁts could also be
larger in schools with more high-achieving girls striving for
the award. We estimate these effects by interacting the
program indicator with measures of baseline school quality,
including the mean 2000 test score as well as the proportion
of grade 6 girls who were among the top 15% in their
district on the 2000 test. Neither of these terms is signiﬁcant
at traditional conﬁdence levels (not shown), so we cannot
reject the hypothesis that average effects were the same
across schools at various academic quality levels.
B. Channels for Merit Scholarship Impacts
Teacher attendance. The estimated program impact on
overall teacher school attendance in the pooled Busia and
Teso sample is large and statistically signiﬁcant at 4.8
percentage points (standard error 2.0 percentage points,
21 Although the program had similar test score impacts across socioeco-
nomic backgrounds, students with more educated parents nonetheless
were more likely to win because they have higher baseline scores.
TABLE 5.—PROGRAM TEST SCORE IMPACTS,C OHORTS 1 AND 2B OYS
Dependent Variable: Normalized Test Scores from 2001 and 2002
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: ITT sample
Program school 0.08 0.10 0.04
(0.13) (0.20) (0.14)
Sample size 4,058 2,331 1,727
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mean of dependent
variable 0.18 0.19 0.16
Lee lower bound 0.02 0.10 0.25*
(0.13) (0.20) (0.13)
Lee upper bound 0.12 0.10 0.19
(0.13) (0.20) (0.13)
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B: Restricted sample
Program school 0.05 0.07 0.15* 0.03
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Mean school test score, 2000 0.77*** 0.86*** 0.65***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Sample size 3,838 3,838 2,256 1,582
R2 0.00 0.23 0.29 0.16
Mean of dependent variable 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.18
Lee lower bound 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.25***
(0.13) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Lee upper bound 0.17 0.17*** 0.18** 0.18***
(0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel C: Longitudinal sample
Program school 0.09 0.14** 0.24*** 0.03
(0.14) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09)
Individual test score, 2000 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.77***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Sample size 1,275 1,275 851 424
R2 0.00 0.71 0.75 0.63
Mean of dependent variable 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.27
Lee lower bound 0.20 0.02 0.18** 0.22**
(0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
Lee upper bound 0.34*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.13
(0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Notes:
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS regressions; Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations in the same school but not across schools. District ﬁxed effects are included in
panelAregression 1 and panels B and C in regressions 1 and 2, and cohort ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Test scores were normalized such that comparison group test scores had mean 0 and standard
deviation 1.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 448table 7, panelA, regression 1).22 Together with the test score
impacts above, teacher attendance is the second educational
outcome for which there are large, positive, and statistically
signiﬁcant impacts in the pooled Busia and Teso district
sample.
In our data, distinguishing between teacher attendance in
grade 6 classes versus other grades is difﬁcult. The same
teacher often teaches a subject (e.g., mathematics) in several
grades, and the data set does not allow us to isolate particular
teacher attendance observations by the grade he or she was
teaching at the time of the attendance check. However, data
from another sample of primary schools in Busia and Teso
reveal that 62.9% of all teachers teach at least one grade 6
class. If all attendance gains were concentrated among this
subset of teachers, the implied program effect for teachers who
teach at least one grade 6 class would be an even larger
4.8/0.629  7.6 percentage point increase in attendance.
Although teacher attendance gains are signiﬁcant in the
pooled sample, the strongest effects are once again in Busia
district: the impact on teacher attendance there was 7.0
percentage points (standard error 2.4, signiﬁcant at 99%
conﬁdence, table 7, panel A, regression 2), reducing overall
teacher absenteeism by approximately half. The implied
effect among those teaching grade 6 if attendance gains
were concentrated in this group is 11.1 percentage points.
Note that the mean school baseline 2000 test score is
positively but only moderately correlated with teacher at-
tendance, and all results are robust to excluding this term.
Estimated program impacts in Busia are not statistically
signiﬁcantly different by teacher’s gender or experience (not
shown). Program impacts on teacher attendance are positive
but smaller and not signiﬁcant in Teso (1.6 percentage
points, regression 3).
Recall the ITT sample gains are 0.27 standard deviations
for Busia girls (table 4, panel A) and 0.10 standard devia-
tions for Busia boys (table 5, panel A). A study in a rural
Indian setting ﬁnds that a 10 percentage point increase in
teacher attendance increased average primary school test
scores by 0.10 standard deviations there (Duﬂo & Hanna,
2006). If a similar relationship holds in rural Kenya, the
estimated teacher attendance gain of 11.1 percentage points
would explain a bit less than half of the overall test score
gain among girls and almost exactly the entire effect for
22 These results are for all regular (senior and assistant) classroom
teachers. A regression that also includes nursery teachers, administrators
(head teachers and deputy head teachers), and classroom volunteers yields
a somewhat smaller but still statistically signiﬁcant point estimate of 3.6
percentage points (standard error 1.6, not shown).
TABLE 6.—PROGRAM TEST SCORE QUARTILE EFFECTS,L ONGITUDINAL SAMPLE COHORT 1
Dependent variable: Normalized Test Scores from 2001
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Girls
Top quartile 	 treatment 0.00 0.08 0.15
(0.13) (0.16) (0.27)
Second quartile 	 treatment 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.12
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17)
Third quartile 	 treatment 0.13 0.19 0.01
(0.09) (0.13) (0.10)
Bottom quartile 	 treatment 0.12 0.23 0.10
(0.20) (0.30) (0.14)
Sample size 1,153 768 385
R2 0.54 0.58 0.50
Mean of dependent variable 0.05 0.03 0.09
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Boys
Top quartile 	 treatment 0.11 0.03 0.38*
(0.12) (0.15) (0.19)
Second quartile 	 treatment 0.18** 0.24** 0.06
(0.09) (0.11) (0.15)
Third quartile 	 treatment 0.11 0.10 0.04
(0.09) (0.11) (0.15)
Bottom quartile 	 treatment 0.18* 0.33*** 0.10
(0.10) (0.13) (0.16)
Sample size 1,275 851 424
R2 0.63 0.68 0.56
Mean of dependent variable 0.24 0.23 0.27
Notes:
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS regressions; Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations in the same school but not across schools. District ﬁxed effects are included in
panel A and panel B regression 1, and cohort ﬁxed effects and quartile ﬁxed effects are included in all speciﬁcations. Test scores were normalized such that comparison group test scores had mean 0 and standard
deviation 1. Quartiles refer to scores in the preprogram 2000 test score distribution.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 449boys. The remaining gains for girls are likely to be due to
increased student effort and, more speculatively, within
classroom spillovers.
Several mechanisms could potentially have increased
teacher effort in response to the merit scholarship program,
including ego rents, social prestige, and even gifts from
winners’ parents. While we cannot rule out those mecha-
nisms, we have anecdotal evidence that increased parental
monitoring played a role. The June 2003 teacher interviews
suggest greater parental monitoring occurred in Busia but not
in Teso. One Busia teacher mentioned that after the program
was introduced, parents began to “ask teachers to work hard so
that [their daughters] can win more scholarships.” A teacher in
another Busia school asserted that parents visited the school
more frequently to check up on teachers and to “encourage the
pupils to put in more efforts.” There were no comparable
accounts from teachers in Teso schools.
Yet there is little quantitative evidence the program
changed teacher behavior beyond increasing attendance.
Program school students were no more likely than compar-
ison students to report being called on by a teacher in class
during the last two days or to have done more homework (as
we discuss in table 8 below). Similarly, program impacts on
classroom inputs, including the number of ﬂip charts and
desks (using data gathered during 2002 classroom observa-
tions), are similarly near zero and not statistically signiﬁcant
(regressions not shown).
One way teachers could potentially game the system is by
diverting their effort toward students eligible for the pro-
gram, but there is no statistically signiﬁcant difference in
FIGURE 3.—YEAR 1 (2001) TEST SCORE IMPACTS BY BASELINE (2000) TEST SCORE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROGRAM AND COMPARISON SCHOOLS,
LONGITUDINAL SAMPLE
(NONPARAMETRIC FAN LOCALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSION)
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Note: These ﬁgures present nonparametric Fan locally weighted regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.7. Conﬁdence intervals were constructed by drawing 50 bootstrap replications.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 450how often girls are called on in class relative to boys in the
program versus comparison schools based on student survey
data (not shown), indicating that program teachers probably
did not substantially divert attention to girls. This ﬁnding,
together with the increased teacher attendance, provides a
concrete explanation of spillovers for boys: greater teaching
effort directed to the class as a whole.
Student attendance. We ﬁnd suggestive evidence of
student attendance gains. The dependent variable is school
participation during the competition year. Since school
participation information was collected for all students,
even those who did not take the 2001 or 2002 exams, these
estimates are less subject to sample attrition bias than test
scores, although attrition concerns are not entirely elimi-
nated since school participation data were not collected at
schools that dropped out of the program.23 For cohort 1
students, one observation was made in 2001, and cohort 2
had three unannounced attendance checks in 2002.
While the estimated program impact on school participa-
tion among girls in the pooled Busia and Teso sample is near
zero, the impact in Busia is positive at 3.2 percentage points
(signiﬁcant at 90%, table 7, panel B, regression 2). This
23 In the Busia comparison sample, girls with higher average school
participation have signiﬁcantly higher baseline test scores: cohort 1 girls
who were present in school on the ﬁrst visit during the competition year
(2001) had baseline 2000 scores 0.14 standard deviations higher than
those who were not present (standard error 0.08, regression not shown).
This cross-sectional correlation is consistent with the view that improved
attendance may be an important channel through which the program
generated test score gains, although by itself is not decisive due to
potential omitted variable bias.
TABLE 7.—PROGRAM IMPACTS ON TEACHER ATTENDANCE IN 2002 (PANEL A) AND SCHOOL PARTICIPATION IMPACTS IN 2001 AND 2002, COHORTS 1 AND 2
(PANELS B AND C)
Dependent Variable: Teacher Attendance in 2002
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Teacher attendance
Program school 0.048*** 0.070*** 0.016
(0.020) (0.024) (0.035)
Mean school test score, 2000 0.040*** 0.034** 0.033*
(0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Sample size 1,065 652 413
R2 0.02 0.04 0.01
Mean of dependent variable 0.84 0.86 0.83
Dependent Variable: Average Student School Participation
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel B: Girls’ school participation
Program school 0.006 0.032* 0.029
(0.015) (0.018) (0.023)
Mean school test score, 2000 0.028** 0.010 0.054***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Sample size 3,343 2,033 1,310
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02
Mean of dependent variable 0.88 0.87 0.88
Dependent Variable: Average Student School Participation
Busia and Teso Busia Teso
(1) (2) (3)
Panel C: Boys’ school participation
Program school 0.009 0.006 0.030
(0.018) (0.027) (0.021)
Mean school test score, 2000 0.021 0.002 0.050***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.014)
Sample size 3,757 2,221 1,536
R2 0.00 0.00 0.02
Mean of dependent variable 0.85 0.85 0.85
Notes:
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
OLS regressions; Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations in the same school but not across schools. The teacher attendance visits were
unannounced, and actual teacher presence at school was recorded during three unannounced school visits in 2002. The teacher attendance sample encompasses all senior and assistant classroom teachers and excludes
nursery school teachers and administrators in all schools participating in the program. The sample in panels B and C includes students in schools that did not pull out of the program. Each school participation
observation takes on a value of 1 if the student was present in school on the day of an unannounced attendance check and 0 for any pupil who is absent or dropped out, and is coded as missing for any pupil whom
died, transferred, or for whom the information was unknown. One student school participation observation took place in the 2001 school year and three in 2002. The 2002 observations are averaged in the panels
B and C regressions, so that each school year receives equal weight.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 451corresponds to a reduction of roughly one-quarter in mean
school absenteeism.
The largest student attendance effects occurred in 2001,
corresponding to the competition year for cohort 1 students:
cohort 1 Busia students had an 8 percentage point increase
in attendance. There is also some evidence of preprogram
effects in 2001 among cohort 2 students in the Busia and
Teso sample (regressions not shown). School participation
impacts were not signiﬁcantly different across school terms
1, 2, and 3 in 2002 (regression not shown), so there is no
evidence that attendance spiked in the run-up to term 3
exams due to cramming, for instance. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that school participation gains among cohort 1
girls are equal across baseline 2000 test score quartiles (not
shown). School participation gains are much smaller for
boys, both overall and in Busia district (table 7, panel C).
The scholarship program had no statistically signiﬁcant
effect on dropping out of school in the competition year in
either Busia or Teso among boys or girls (not shown).
Postcompetition test score effects. In the restricted sam-
ple, the program not only raised test scores for cohort 1 girls
when it was introduced in 2001 but appears to have contin-
ued boosting their scores in 2002: the estimated program
impact for cohort 1 girls in 2002 is 0.12 standard deviations
(standard error 0.08, p-value  0.12, not shown). This is
suggestive evidence that the program had lasting effects on
learning rather than simply encouraging cramming or cheat-
ing. When we focus on Busia district alone, there is even
stronger evidence, with a coefﬁcient estimate of 0.24 stan-
dard deviations (standard error 0.09, signiﬁcant at 95%
conﬁdence, not shown).24 These persistent gains can be seen
in ﬁgure 4 (especially in panel A, for Busia girls), which
presents the distribution of test scores for longitudinal
sample students. Once again there are no detectable gains in
Teso district (panels C and D).
February 2003 exams provide further evidence. Although
originally administered because 2002 exams were cancelled
in Teso district, they were also offered in our Busia sample
schools. In the restricted sample, the average program
impact for cohort 1 Busia girls was 0.19 standard deviations
(standard error 0.07, statistically signiﬁcant at 99% conﬁ-
dence; regression not shown).
Student attitudes and behaviors. We also attempted to
measure intrinsic motivation for education directly, using
eight survey questions asking students to compare how
much they liked a school activity (e.g., doing homework)
compared to nonschool activity (e.g., fetching water, play-
ing sports). When the 2002 survey was administered, cohort
2 girls were competing for the award (cohort 1 girls had
already competed in 2001), so we focus here on cohort 2.
Overall, students report preferring the school activity in
72% of the questions. There are no statistically signiﬁcant
differences in this index across the program and comparison
schools for girls or boys (table 8, panel A), and thus no
evidence that external incentives dampened intrinsic moti-
vation to learn as captured by this measure.25 Similarly,
program and comparison school girls and boys are equally
likely to think of themselves as a “good student,” to think
“being a good student means working hard,” or to think they
can be in the top three students in their class, based on their
survey responses.
There is no evidence that study habits changed adversely
in other dimensions measured by the 2002 student survey.
Program school students were no more or less likely than
comparison school students to seek out extra tutoring, use a
textbook at home during the past week, hand in homework,
or do chores at home, and this holds for both girls and boys
in the pooled Busia and Teso sample (table 8, panel B) as
well as in each district separately (not shown). In the case of
chores, the estimated zero impact indicates the program did
not lead to lost home production, suggesting that any in-
creased study effort came out of children’s leisure or
through intensiﬁed effort during school hours.
We also ﬁnd weak evidence of increased investments in
girls’ school supplies by households, suggesting another
possible mechanism for test score gains. In the pooled Busia
and Teso sample, the estimated program impact on the
number of textbooks girls have at home and the number of
new books (the sum of new textbooks and exercise books)
their household recently purchased for them are positive,
though not statistically signiﬁcant (table 8, panel C). Point
estimates for Busia girls alone are similarly positive and
somewhat larger and, in the case of textbooks at home,
marginally statistically signiﬁcant (0.27 additional textbook,
standard error 0.17, not shown).26
One concern related to the interpretation of our ﬁndings is
the possibility of cheating on the exams, but this appears
unlikely. Exams in Kenya are administered by outside
monitors, and district records from those monitors indicate
no documentation of cheating in any sample school in 2001
or 2002. Several ﬁndings already presented also argue
against cheating: test score gains among cohort 1 students in
scholarship schools persisted a full year after the exam
competition when there was no direct incentive to cheat, and
program schoolboys ineligible for the scholarship showed
24 The signiﬁcant effect of the scholarship program on second-year test
scores among cohort 1 students is not merely due to the winners in those
schools. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impacts of winning the award on 2002 test
scores. In addition, the postcompetition results remain signiﬁcant when
excluding the winners from the sample (not shown).
25 In an SUR framework including all attitude measures in table 8, panel
A, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the joint effect is 0 for girls
(p-value  0.92) and boys (p-value  0.36).
26 There is a signiﬁcant increase in textbook use among Busia program
girls in cohort 1 in 2002: girls in program schools report using textbooks
at home 5 percentage points (signiﬁcant at 90% conﬁdence) more than
comparison school girls, further suggestive evidence of greater parental
investment. However, there are no such gains among the cohort 2 students
competing for the award in 2002.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 452substantial gains (although cheating by teachers could still
potentially explain that latter result).
Regarding cramming, there is no evidence that extra test
preparation coaching increased in the program schools for
either girls or boys (table 8, panel B).27 A separate teacher-
incentive project run earlier in the same region led to
increased test preparation sessions and boosted short-run
test scores, but it had no measurable effect on either student
or teacher attendance or long-run learning, consistent with
the hypothesis that teachers responded to that program by
seeking to manipulate short-run scores (Glewwe, Ilias, &
Kremer, 2003). There is no evidence for similar effects in
the program we study, although a deﬁnitive explanation for
the differences across these two programs remains elusive.
Another issue is the Hawthorne effect—an effect driven
by students knowing they were being studied rather than
due to the intervention itself—but this too is unlikely for
at least two reasons. First, both program and comparison
schools were visited frequently to collect data, and thus
mere contact with the NGO and enumerators alone can-
not explain effects. Moreover, ﬁve other primary school
program evaluations have been carried out in the study
area (as discussed in Kremer, Miguel, & Thornton, 2005),
but no other program generated such substantial test
score gains.
27 Similarly, recent work on high-stakes tests suggests that individuals
may increase their effort only during the actual test taking, potentially
making test scores a good measure of effort that day but an unreliable
measure of actual learning or ability (Segal, 2006). While the tests in
Kenya were high stakes, the fact that we also see similar test score gains
for cohort 1 in 2002 when there was no longer a scholarship at stake
indicates that the effects we estimate are likely due to real learning rather
than solely to increased motivation on the competition testing day.
FIGURE 4.—YEAR 2 (2002) TEST SCORES,C OHORT 1, LONGITUDINAL SAMPLE
(NONPARAMETRIC KERNEL DENSITIES)
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Note: These ﬁgures present nonparametric kernel densities using an Epanechnikov kernel.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 453Merit scholarships and inequality. The equity critiques
of merit scholarships resonate with our results in one sense:
the scholarship award winners do tend to come from fam-
ilies where parents have signiﬁcantly more years of educa-
tional attainment, and thus from relatively advantaged
households (see section IIA). But in terms of student test
score performance, we ﬁnd that program impacts are not
just concentrated among the best students: there are positive
estimated treatment effects for girls throughout the baseline
test score distribution (table 6). There are also no signiﬁcant
program interaction effects with household socioeconomic
measures, including parent education, and even girls with
poorly educated parents gained from the program.
Program impacts on inequality are important in both theo-
retical and policy debates over merit scholarships. Perhaps not
surprisingly, given the observed gains throughout the test score
distribution, there was only a small overall increase in test
score variance for cohort 1 program schoolgirls relative to
cohort 1 comparison girls in the ITT sample: the overall
variance of test scores rises from 0.88 in 2000 at baseline to
0.94 in 2001 and 0.97 in 2002 for Busia program schoolgirls,
while the analogous variances for Busia comparison girls are
0.92 in 2000, 0.90 in 2001, and 0.92 in 2002; however, the
difference across the two groups is not statistically signiﬁcant
at traditional conﬁdence levels in any year.28 The changes in
test variance over time for boys in Busia program versus
comparison schools, as well as for Teso girls and boys, are
similarly small and never statistically signiﬁcant (not shown).29
V. Conclusion
Merit-based scholarships are an important part of the
educational system in many countries, but are often debated
on the grounds of effectiveness and equity. We present
evidence that such programs can raise test scores and boost
28 The slight, though insigniﬁcant, increase in test score inequality in
program schools is inconsistent with one particular naive model of
cheating, in which program schoolteachers simply pass out test answers to
their students. This would reduce inequality in program relative to com-
parison schools. We thank Joel Sobel for this point.
29 One potential concern with these ﬁgures is the changing sample sizes
in the 2000, 2001, and 2002 exams. But even if we consider the Busia girls
cohort 1 longitudinal sample, where the sample is identical across 2000
and 2001, there are no signiﬁcant differences in test variance across
program and comparison schools in either year.
TABLE 8.—PROGRAM IMPACT ON EDUCATION HABITS,I NPUTS, AND ATTITUDES FOR COHORT 2R ESTRICTED SAMPLE IN 2002
Dependent Variables










Panel A: Attitudes toward education
Student prefers school to other activities (index)a 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.72
(0.01) (0.18) (0.01) (0.18)
Student thinks he or she is a “good student” 0.02 0.73 0.03 0.73
(0.04) (0.44) (0.03) (0.44)
Student thinks being a “good student” means “working hard” 0.02 0.69 0.03 0.63
(0.03) (0.46) (0.03) (0.48)
Student thinks can be in top three in the class 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.40
(0.04) (0.47) (0.03) (0.49)
Panel B: Study/work habits
Student went for extra coaching in last two days 0.04 0.40 0.02 0.42
(0.04) (0.49) (0.05) (0.49)
Student used a textbook at home in last week 0.01 0.85 0.04 0.80
(0.03) (0.36) (0.03) (0.40)
Student did homework in last two days 0.03 0.78 0.01 0.73
(0.04) (0.41) (0.04) (0.45)
Teacher asked the student a question in class in last two days 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.82
(0.04) (0.39) (0.03) (0.38)
Amount of time did chores at homeb 0.02 2.63 0.01 2.41
(0.05) (0.82) (0.05) (0.81)
Panel C: Educational inputs
Number of textbooks at home 0.09 3.83 0.15 3.61
(0.19) (2.15) (0.15) (2.19)
Number of new books bought in last term 0.15 1.54 0.03 1.37
(0.14) (1.48) (0.12) (1.42)
Notes:
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Marginal probit coefﬁcient estimates are presented when the dependent variable is an indicator variable, and OLS regression is performed otherwise. Huber robust standard errors in parentheses. Disturbance terms
are allowed to be correlated across observations in the same school but not across schools. Each coefﬁcient estimate is the product of a separate regression, where the explanatory variables are a program school
indicator, as well as mean school test score in 2000. Surveys were not collected in schools that dropped out of the program. The sample size varies from 700 to 850 observations, depending on the extent of missing
data in the dependent variable.
a The “student prefers school to other activities” index is the average of eight binary variables indicating whether the student prefers a school activity (coded as 1) or a nonschool activity (coded 0). The school
activities are doing homework, going to school early in the morning, and staying in class for extra coaching. These capture aspects of student intrinsic motivation. The nonschool activities are fetching water, playing
games or sports, looking after livestock, cooking meals, cleaning the house, or doing work on the farm.
b Household chores are ﬁshing, washing clothes, working on the farm, and shopping at the market. Time doing chores are “never,” “half an hour,” “one hour,” “two hours” “three hours,” and “more than three
hours” (coded 0–5, with 5 as most time).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 454classroom effort as captured in teacher attendance. We also
ﬁnd suggestive evidence for program spillovers. In partic-
ular, we estimate positive program effects among girls with
low pretest scores who had little realistic chance of winning
the scholarship. In the district where the program had larger
positive effects, even boys, who were ineligible for awards,
show somewhat higher test scores. These positive external-
ities are likely to be due to higher teacher attendance or
positive peer effects among students, or a combination of
these reasons. Our data are unable to distinguish which is
the greater cause of the estimated test score impacts.
In addition to the girls’ merit scholarship program, a
number of other school programs have recently been con-
ducted in the study area: a teacher incentive program
(Glewwe, Ilias, & Kremer, 2003), textbook provision pro-
gram (Glewwe et al., 1997), ﬂip chart program (Glewwe et
al., 2004), deworming program (Miguel & Kremer, 2004),
and a child sponsorship program that provided a range of
inputs (Kremer, Moulin, & Namunyu, 2003). By comparing
the cost-effectiveness of each program, we conclude that
providing merit scholarship incentives is arguably the most
cost-effective way to improve test scores among these six
programs. Considering Busia and Teso districts together, the
girls’scholarship program is almost exactly as cost-effective
in boosting test scores as the teacher incentive program,
followed by textbook provision (see Kremer et al., 2005, for
details). Considering Busia alone, girls’ scholarships are
more cost-effective than the other programs.
Our evidence on within-classroom learning externalities
has several implications for research and public policy.
Methodologically, these externality effects suggest that
other merit award program evaluations that randomize eli-
gibility among individuals within schools may understate
program impacts due to contamination across treatment and
comparison groups. This issue may be important for the
interpretation of results from the other recent merit award
studies described in Section I and, more broadly, for any
education program evaluation that assigns treatment to a
subset of students within a classroom.30
Substantively, a key reservation about merit awards for
educators has been the possibility of adverse equity impacts.
It is likely that relatively advantaged students gained the
most from the program: scholarship winners do come from
the most educated households. However, groups with little
chance at winning an award, including girls with low
baseline test scores and poorly educated parents, also gained
considerably in merit scholarship program schools.
One way to spread the beneﬁts of a merit scholarship
program even more widely could be to restrict the scholar-
ship competition to poorer pupils, schools, or regions or to
conduct multiple competitions, each in a restricted geo-
graphic area. For instance, if each Kenyan location, a small
administrative unit, awarded merit scholarships to its resi-
dents independent of other locations, children would com-
pete only against others in the same area, where many have
comparable socioeconomic conditions. To the extent that
such a policy would put more students near the margin of
winning a scholarship, it could potentially generate even
greater incentive effects and spillovers.
More speculatively, the spillover beneﬁts among students
with little chance of winning the award are consistent with
a model of strategic complementarity among the effort
levels of girls eligible for the award, the effort of teachers,
and of other students. If such complementarity is sufﬁ-
ciently strong, there could be multiple equilibria in the
classroom learning culture. Educators often stress the im-
portance of classroom culture. Multiple equilibria could
help explain why conventional educational variables, in-
cluding the pupil-teacher ratio and expenditures on inputs
like textbooks, explain only a modest fraction of variation in
test score performance, typically with R2 values on the order
of 0.2 to 0.3 (Summers & Wolfe, 1977 Hanushek, 2003).
Our ﬁnding that merit scholarships motivate students to
increase effort, and that this may generate positive external-
ities of other students, provides a potential public policy
rationale for the widespread practice of structuring educa-
tion systems so that those who perform well in one level of
education are entitled to free or subsidized access to the next
level. It also suggests that centralized education systems that
are responsible for not just higher education but also for
lower levels of schooling may prefer different higher edu-
cation admissions procedures than individual institutions of
higher education would choose in a decentralized system.
Individual institutions might choose to admit students based
on a mix of aptitude and achievement tests that optimally
predicts achievement in higher education. Relative to this
benchmark, a centralized education authority might prefer
to place higher weight on achievement tests because this
creates incentives for students to exert higher effort in lower
levels of education, creating positive spillovers for other
students. This could potentially help explain why many
European countries, with their more centralized education
systems, place more weight on achievement relative to
aptitude testing in determining admission to higher educa-
tion. It is also consistent with the view that student effort in
secondary school is low in the United States relative to
Europe. (See Harbaugh, 2003, for an argument along these
lines.)
We ﬁnd especially large average program effects on girls’
test scores in Busia, on the order of 0.2 to 0.3 standard
deviations, but do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in neighboring
Teso district. Our inability to ﬁnd these effects may be due
in part to differential sample attrition across Teso program
and comparison schools, which complicates the economet-
ric analysis. However, it may also simply reﬂect the lower
value placed on winning the merit award there or a lack of
local political support among some parents and community
opinion leaders.
30 Miguel and Kremer (2004) also discuss treatment effect estimation in
the presence of externalities.
INCENTIVES TO LEARN 455Establishing where, how, and why student incentive pro-
grams succeed or fail thus remains an important priority for
future research. The sharply different effects of the program
impacts we estimate, measured either by test scores or program
participation, across two neighboring districts raises important
questions about how local responses to merit awards vary
across time and space, and thus how successfully student
incentive programs of this kind will scale up. The recent
literature, surveyed in section I, has not yet yielded consistent
ﬁndings about merit scholarship impacts. Thus, for example,
Angrist and Lavy (2002) ﬁnd that one of their two Israeli pilot
programs generated positive impacts on learning, and the other
did not. One of the two experimental university merit award
programs in OECD countries has produced positive test score
impacts among high-achieving students and negative impacts
among low-achieving students (Leuven et al., 2003), although
a second largely found no effects (Angrist, Lang, et al., 2006).
It may be impossible for any single study to establish why
these types of programs generally succeed or fail, but accumu-
lating evidence across studies may be more promising. How-
ever, our study provides no evidence that merit scholarships
generate the adverse impacts on academic performance that
educators and psychologists sometimes fear or that other lead-
ing objections to merit awards are empirically important.
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